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Metonymic relationships among actuality, modality, evaluation, and emotion

Abstract: In this chapter I argue that associative relations exist among the conceptual categories of ACTUALITY, MODALITY, EVALUATION, and EMOTION, and that language users exploit these relations to invite metonymic inferences. These relations are significant in the construction of illocutionary meanings; they manifest themselves in the use of e.g. “hedged performatives” such as *I can inform you that p* or *I must inform you that p*. These utterances, despite the use of the hedges *can* and *must*, typically count as acts of *actual* informing. I argue that the ACTUALITY interpretation is motivated by general metonymic inference schemas, viz. ABILITY → ACTUALITY and OBLIGATION → ACTUALITY, respectively, which, under certain contextual conditions, induce a performative interpretation. Furthermore, modal hedges, like *can* and *must*, on performative verbs also metonymically evoke target senses of positive or negative EVALUATION and EMOTION. The metonymic relation between the latter two meaning components is reciprocal and is an instance of the high-level metonymy CAUSE → EFFECT.

1 Introduction

There exists no uniform conception of metonymy in cognitive linguistics, but it is generally agreed that metonymy is a fundamental conceptual tool that allows language users to convey meanings beyond those that are explicitly coded in a linguistic message (for overviews and discussion, see, e.g., Bierwiazzonek 2013; Littlemore 2015; Panther and Thornburg 2007; Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez 2014). The recipient of this volume, Dirk Geeraerts, has contributed substantially to this issue and many other central topics in cognitive linguistics (for metonymy, see, e.g., Geeraerts 2010; Peirsman and Geeraerts 2006).

The classical definition proposed by Radden and Kövecses (1999), which characterizes metonymy as a conceptual means to access target meanings on the basis of explicitly coded source meanings, is compatible with the idea that metonymies are natural inference schemas (e.g. Panther and Thornburg 2003). It is also compatible with Langacker’s (2008: 69) characterization of metonymy

as a reference-point phenomenon, and the notion of prototypical metonymy developed by Peirsman and Geeraerts (2006). The inferential nature of metonymy has been argued for by a number of cognitive linguists (see, e.g., Barcelona 2011 for an overview), and it is this conception of metonymy that is adopted in this contribution.

The scholars cited in the preceding paragraph advocate a relatively broad view of metonymy. In contrast, Croft (2006: 321) proposes that the scope of metonymy should be restricted to “domain highlighting of autonomous predications”. The notion of autonomous predication, which Croft adopts from Langacker, holds for nouns, and Croft claims that nouns (and presumably noun phrases) are the locus of metonymy. In other words, Croft restricts the use of the concept “metonymy” to referential metonymy, which to me seems an unnecessary limitation of the scope of metonymic processes. In this chapter it is assumed that metonymies are operative on the referential, predication, and illocutionary levels (for a justification of this view, see, e.g., Panther and Thornburg 1999, 2007).

The aim of my contribution is to provide some evidence for tight associative or conceptually contiguous relations among the concepts of ACTUALITY, MODALITY, EVALUATION, and EMOTION. These associative relations may manifest themselves as linguistic metonymies. They are especially significant on the illocutionary level; i.e., they play an important role in the interpretation of speech acts.

To illustrate the role of the above-mentioned conceptual categories in speech act interpretation, consider the evaluative statement (1a) from the *Corpus of Contemporary American English* (COCA). I claim that (1a) is metonymically linked to a modal (deontic) statement such as (1b), and to the expression of an emotional attitude in (1c); and each of (1a–c) may be used to convey a directive illocutionary act as in (1d)¹:

- (1) a. It is *bad* to mistrust those who deserve trust [...] (COCA 2003) [evaluative]
- b. You/one *should* not mistrust those who deserve trust. [deontic modal]
- c. It is an *annoying/irritating* attitude to mistrust those who deserve trust. [emotive]
- d. Do not mistrust those who deserve trust. [directive speech act]

¹ In this example, as throughout the chapter, italics have been added to highlight relevant parts of the data.

The metonymic relations between (1a–d) can be represented as an inferential chain such as (2) (where the metonymic relation is symbolized by the arrow ‘→’):

- (2) BAD p → SHOULD (NEG p) → ANNOYING p → REQUEST (NEG p)

In (2), p denotes a propositional content, which in the case of (1a–d) is something like ‘X mistrust(s) those who deserve trust’, and NEG is a negation operator.

In English there exist also metonymically exploitable relations among modalities such as ABILITY, OBLIGATION, and PERMISSION as source meanings, and ACTUALITY as their respective target meanings (see, e.g., Panther and Thornburg 1999; Panther 2015). In other words, one may posit a high-level metonymy VIRTUALITY → ACTUALITY. The following data illustrate some subtypes of this metonymy, where the first utterance is the linguistic vehicle that provides the metonymic source meaning and the second utterance represents the metonymic target meaning:

ABILITY OF SENSE PERCEPTION → ACTUAL SENSE PERCEPTION (see Panther 2015: 215)

- (3) Madam President, I *can hear* a ripple of laughter from the Socialists. (Europarl parallel corpus) → I *hear* a ripple of laughter from the socialists.
 (4) We *could see* the northern lights today, thanks to solar flare. (Google search, accessed March 10, 2015) → We *saw* the northern lights today [...].

ABILITY TO ACT → ACTUAL ACTION

- (5) My mother was *able to raise* two kids by herself while still going to college [...] (COCA 2012) → My mother *raised* two kids by herself [...].
 (6) The Huthis were *able to seize* and *hold* various government installations and military bases [...]. (COCA 2012) → The Huthis *seized* and *held* various government installations and military bases [...].

OBLIGATION TO ACT → ACTUAL ACTION

- (7) We *had to cut back* on spending, as you probably know [...]. (COCA 2012) → We *cut back* on spending [...].
 (8) We *were obligated to make sure* the Danish art pieces got over here. (COCA 2005) → We *made sure* the Danish art pieces got over here.

PERMISSION TO ACT → ACTUAL ACTION

- (9) Occasionally he was *allowed to conduct* research for a reporter. (COCA 2012)
→ Occasionally he *conducted* research for a reporter.
- (10) He was *allowed to make* several calls from his cell phone. (COCA 2011) →
He *made* several phone calls from his cell phone.

It should be noted that the link between metonymic source and metonymic target in examples (3)–(10) is *more or less* coercive. In the case of the inference from ABILITY OF SENSE PERCEPTION to ACTUAL SENSE PERCEPTION, the link is strong, especially if the intended target denotatum is a specific perceptual event². In fact, in utterances (5) and (6), an ACTUALITY reading is so strongly evoked that various linguists and philosophers of language have argued that the relation between source and target is one of semantic implication, referred to as *actuality entailment* (see Bhatt 2006: 159–176, and the references therein)³. The link between OBLIGATION TO ACT and ACTUAL ACTION is also tight and not cancellable in the discourse context of (7). A contributing factor that strongly evokes an ACTUALITY reading is the past tense and the perfective aspect of the modal (for the inference from OBLIGATION to ACTUALITY in French, see, e.g., Asher & Hunter 2012: 57). However, the past tense and the perfective aspect do not seem to be the only factors that induce an ACTUALITY reading. In the case of (8), the ACTUALITY inference could be cancelled quite easily, as in (11):

- (11) We *were obligated to make sure* the Danish art pieces got over here; but unfortunately, we didn't manage to get them over here.

The link between PERMISSION TO ACT and ACTUAL ACTION seems somewhat looser than in the case of past ABILITY and OBLIGATION, and more easily defeasible. Under normal circumstances, it is however expected that the addressee of an act of

² Note however that there are languages like Hungarian and some Romance languages, in which actual sense perception can only be expressed non-metonymically.

³ If this analysis is correct, some metonymies would be based on an entailment relation between source and target meaning. In many publications, the present author and Linda Thornburg have argued against such a position and maintained that the relation between metonymic source and target is contingent, i.e. in principle defeasible (e.g. Panther 2006; Panther and Thornburg 2007, Forthcoming), but detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this contribution.

permission will actually carry out the permitted action – especially if it is assumed that the action benefits the permittee.

To summarize, the conceptual domain of EVALUATION is linked to EMOTION, and MODALITY may metonymically evoke ACTUALITY. The degree of coerciveness of metonymies constitutes an interesting topic in its own right but a discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this contribution.

MODALITY and ACTUALITY are also tightly connected with EVALUATION and EMOTION. In section 2, the central part of this contribution, the functions of these metonymic associations are investigated in more detail. My thesis is that they are relevant to a proper understanding of illocutionary acts, and evidence for this hypothesis is provided by a specific type of speech acts known as *hedged performatives*. Section 3 concludes the chapter with a summary of the metonymies postulated, and the claim that a number of the metonymies postulated are instances of the high-level metonymy CAUSE → EFFECT.

2 The role of ability, obligation, evaluation and emotivity in hedged performatives

Among illocutionary acts, *explicit performative utterances* (e.g. Austin 1962; and from a cognitive linguistic perspective, Sweetser 2001) have been extensively studied by philosophers of language and linguists. Some examples are given in (12):

- (12) a. *I promise* to repeal every single Obamacare regulation. (COCA 2011)
 b. *I advise* you to start selling your surplus cattle right now. (COCA 2005)
 c. *I admit* we sometimes eat it five nights a week [...]. (COCA 2010)
 d. *I ask* you to help me get a ticket [...]. (COCA 2007)
 e. [...] *I suggest* that we work together to build a raft. (COCA 2011)
 f. *I invite* you all to have a wonderful weekend. (COCA 2010)

In uttering (12a–f), the speaker performs the illocutionary acts of promising, advising, admitting, asking (to), suggesting, and inviting, respectively. In each of (12a–f), the illocutionary act performed is explicitly named by the speaker.

Under certain circumstances, English and many other languages allow an illocutionary verb to be “hedged” by a modal or attitudinal expression without any effect on the illocutionary force of the utterance in question. In one of the

first pioneering studies in hedged performatives, Fraser (1975: 187) provides (made-up) examples like the following (my numbering):

- (13) a. I *can promise* that we will be there on time.
- b. I *must advise* you to remain quiet.
- c. I *have to admit* that you have a point.
- d. I *wish to invite* you to my party.
- e. I *will* henceforth stipulate that $x = 4.5$.
- f. I *might suggest* that you ask again.

Fraser (1975: 187) observes that “[e]ach example sentence has the general form of a performative sentence, and each may count as the performance of the illocutionary act denoted by the performative verb [...]”. The sentences (13a–f) differ from explicit performative utterances “in that each contains a modal or semi-modal” (187). Fraser also notes that the modal or attitudinal hedge is not a semantically empty element but makes a contribution to the overall meaning of the utterance in question. For example, (13a) has the illocutionary meaning ‘I promise that we will be there in time’, but there is also some additional meaning provided by the modal *can* (see below).

The interesting point about such modal hedges on performative verbs is that they may or may not affect the illocutionary force denoted by the performative verb. There are two possibilities regarding the semantic-pragmatic relation between hedges and performative verbs:

1. The modal is conceptually and pragmatically compatible with the performative verb and does not affect its illocutionary force. Such cases are genuine hedged performatives and are henceforth called *illocutionary force preserving*.
2. The modal is compatible with the illocutionary verb, but has the effect of *blocking* the force denoted by the performative verb.

Whether the hedge is illocutionary force preserving or not depends on the kind of hedge that specifies the performative verb in question. In sections 2.1 and 2.2, illocutionary force preserving hedged performatives are discussed and, by way of example, the contribution of the meaning of the modal hedges *can* and *must* to the overall meaning of the illocutionary act is analyzed. Section 2.3 discusses some utterances in which the modal cancels the illocutionary force denoted by the performative verb.

2.1 Illocutionary force preserving hedges: the positive role of *can*

Let us begin with a case in which the modal hedge *can* is used with an illocutionary verb of assertion:

- (14) I *can inform* you that the government of Australia has changed for just the seventh time. You obviously enjoy hearing it [...]. (WebCorp)

Utterance (14) is a transcript from a speech given by the newly elected Prime Minister of Australia on September 7, 2013. In the first sentence, the Prime Minister-Elect *informs* his followers that the government of Australia has changed, i.e., the expression *can inform* metonymically evokes the actual act of informing, based on the metonymy ABLITY TO ACT → ACTUAL ACTION, and, more specifically, ABILITY TO PERFORM THE ILLOCUTIONARY ACT → ACTUAL PERFORMANCE OF THE ILLOCUTIONARY ACT. Furthermore, the modal *can* induces the inference that the speaker of (14) believes he is *legitimized* to inform his audience about the change of the government. The term *legitimized* is meant as conveying that the conditions for a felicitous performance of the speech act of informing are fulfilled, including in this case e.g. that the speaker is an authorized spokesperson for a political party or government institution. Apart from triggering an actuality interpretation, *can* conveys implicitly that the propositional content of (14) is *evaluated* as positive, i.e. as good news. The “good news” implication, in turn, gives rise to an *emotional* reaction, viz. the propositional content of the illocutionary act causes, or, at least, is expected to cause, a feeling of pleasure, joy, or happiness in both the speaker and the hearer. This interpretation is bolstered by the second clause in (14) *You obviously enjoy hearing it*.

In this context, it is important to note that the act of informing *per se* has neither positive nor negative evaluative or emotional implications; the positive evaluation and emotional stance are brought into the semantic-pragmatic picture by the modal *can*.

Schematically, the metonymic inferences involved in (14) can be diagrammed as in Figure 1.

As another example with the hedge *can*, this time retrieved from the *Global Web-Based English* corpus (GLoWbE), consider the hedged recommendation (15):

- (15) I *can recommend* the octopus and cress salad, and juicy scallops on a johnnycake (a cornmeal pancake). (GLoWbE 2011)




Fig. 1: *I can inform you that p*

Sentence (15) appeared in a newspaper article on the sights and local foods of San Diego. The writer *recommends* the octopus and cress salad, etc., on the menu, although he literally merely *says* that he *can recommend* these menu items. Literally then, in writing (15), the author asserts what kind of dishes he is able to recommend. As in the case of (14), the illocutionary force of recommending comes about through the metonymy ABILITY TO ACT → ACTUAL ACTION (see also Panther and Thornburg 1999).

The additional inferences triggered by *can* are analogous to those in (14). First, the author of (15) implies that he feels competent and/or legitimized to recommend the menu items in question because of his expertise as a travel writer and food critic. Second, there is, as in (14), an implicit positive evaluation of the propositional content *p* and a corresponding positive emotional stance. One important difference between (14) and (15) is however that in (14) the act of informing as such is evaluatively and emotionally *neutral*; the modal *can* (and possibly additional contextual factors) trigger a positive evaluation and emotion. In contrast, in (15), a positive evaluation is already an intrinsic part of the illocutionary scenario of a recommendation. The scenario contains a component '*p* is beneficial to the hearer'. The modal *can* thus reinforces an inherently given evaluative component of recommendations.

An illocutionary category that is especially “*can*-friendly” is the one that in Searle’s (1969) terminology is called *commissive*. A common way to formulate a promise is (16):

(16) *I can promise* you that we won’t give up [...]. (COCA 2001)

As in the other examples discussed so far, the use of *can* in (16) gives the hearer to understand that the speaker is legitimized to perform the commissive act, and a promise is in fact performed by the speaker. The PROMISE scenario contains as one of its meaning components the speaker’s belief that the promised action (propositional content) benefits the promisee. Promises are thus, by definition, characterized by a positive evaluation of their propositional content. This positive evaluation is reinforced by the implications conveyed by the hedge *can*, which itself triggers metonymic inferences of evaluation and emotivity that are compatible with promises.

The same picture as for *promise* holds for other commissives such as *guarantee* and *offer*:

(17) And I *can guarantee* you that I will not be the only Democrat working for his re-election. (COCA 2004)

(18) I *can offer* you a month’s wages and the fare for your transportation home to New England. (COCA 1994)

Both *guarantee* and *offer* are speech act verbs whose propositional contents are evaluated as good and that are therefore prone to produce sentiments of joy and contentment. As in the case of (14)–(16) *can* highlights these meaning components even more than they would have been if a non-hedged explicit performative utterance had been uttered.

2.2 Illocutionary force preserving hedges: the negative role of *must*

The assertive verb *inform* not only appears with *can* in hedged performative constructions but also with *must*:

(19) I *must inform* you that we are under no obligation to provide you any other documents other than those directly related to the payment of the invoice [...]. (GloWbE, GB)

The inferential structure of *I must inform you that p* is represented in Figure 2.




Fig. 2: *I must inform you that p*

The use of *I must inform you that p* counts as an act of informing – just like *I can inform you that p*. However, the pragmatic implications of these two minimally contrasting constructions are quite different. The performative interpretation of *I must inform you that p* is sanctioned by the metonymy OBLIGATION TO ACT → ACTUAL ACTION. Furthermore, in addition to producing an actuality effect, the modal *must* often correlates with a negative evaluation of the speech act and its propositional content p . In using the modal *must*, the speaker implies that she would rather not or only reluctantly perform the speech act because it conveys bad news for the addressee. Indirectly, the speaker distances herself from her own illocutionary act, conveying that it is the consequence of circumstances beyond her control. Nevertheless, in stating her duty to perform it, the speech act is actually performed.

The following example can be analyzed along the same lines:

- (20) Although I am loath to broach this subject, I *must notify* you that the timely removal of his personal property will obviously impact the amount of money I am able to return to you. (COCA 2007)

Example (20) is to be interpreted as an actual act of notification. The propositional content is, at least potentially, negatively viewed, and, at the same time, the speaker/author gives to understand that the bad news for the addressee is not his or her responsibility.

In the following example, the reluctance to perform the illocutionary act of admitting is already implied by the performative verb itself, but it is reinforced by the use of *must*:

- (21) *I must admit* you did it quite cleverly, but it was a wicked thing to do nonetheless. (COCA 2005)

There is also an implicit evaluation in (21), but, different from (19) and (20), where the propositional content is evaluated as bad for the addressee, the speaker of (21) assesses the action ‘You did it quite cleverly’ as bad, i.e. negative, for his own self-image, as becomes clear from the ensuing context, which qualifies the action carried out by the hearer as *a wicked thing to do*.

Negative evaluation of the propositional content is also an interpretive feature in the following example:

- (22) *I must warn* you that this is not a propitious time to sell – in the middle of a war [...]. (COCA 2004)

Utterance (22) is not just a statement of the speaker that she is under some obligation to warn the hearer (source meaning), but it constitutes an actual warning (target meaning). A warning is a hybrid illocutionary act because it has an assertive force, i.e., its propositional content has a truth value; but implicitly it is also a directive speech act (see Panther and Köpcke 2008: 106). In (22), the propositional content ‘It is not a propitious time to sell in the middle of a war’ licenses the inference ‘Do not sell’. The reasoning that leads to the hedging of the performative verb *warn* with *must* can be informally reconstructed as follows:

- (23) a. S knows/believes that H wants to sell.
 b. But selling in the middle of a war is bad for H, because H would probably not get the desired price.
 c. S therefore feels it is her duty/obligation to warn H of the possibly bad consequences of the action that the hearer intends to perform.
 d. S warns the hearer of the possibly bad consequences of the action that H intends to perform.

Typical directive verbs such as *ask (to)*, *insist (on)*, and *urge* co-occur quite readily with *must* to yield hedged performatives:

- (24) Once again, I *must ask* you to lower your voice. (COCA 2011)
- (25) Mr. Podgers, I *must insist* on your giving me a straightforward answer to a question I am going to put to you. (COCA 2003)
- (26) I *must urge* you, too, to seek counseling, Mrs. Abbott. (COCA 1994)

Apart from signaling that the speaker performs the directive speech act with some reluctance but feels it his or her duty to perform it, *must* conveys a strong evaluation to the effect that the addressee did something inappropriate. In uttering (24), the speaker indirectly refers to the hearer speaking in a loud voice, a behavior that is deemed unacceptable. In (25), the speaker appears to suspect the hearer of not being willing to give a straightforward answer to his question; and in (26), the possibility that Mrs. Abbot is not going to seek counseling is also indirectly evaluated as undesirable. In all of utterances (24)–(26), a metonymic inference is conveyed that some state-of-affairs evoked by their propositional contents is characterized by the feature BAD.

Expressive speech act verbs are quite productively hedged with *must*. But contrary to what has been observed with directive verbs, expressive verbs specified by this modal do not necessarily signal that the speaker would rather not perform the illocutionary act denoted by the expressive verb. In fact, the term *hedged performative* does not even seem felicitous in this context. Thus, examples such as (27)–(30) convey that the speaker feels it is his or her moral or social duty to perform the speech act in question, but does not necessarily give to understand that this act is performed only reluctantly or unwillingly:

- (27) I *must apologize* for not being here in person, but I am surprised, even astonished, and honored, to be making this acceptance speech here this evening. (COCA 2001)
- (28) I *must thank* you for the dance, and even more for your conversation, Miss Bennet. (COCA 2008)
- (29) I *must congratulate* you on your choice of marriage partner, Blake. (COCA 2001)
- (30) Things are well. I *must congratulate* you on your successful trip through Europe. (COCA 2001)
- (31) Higgins, I *must compliment* you, you have an excellent crop of students [...]. (COCA 1993)

As is well known, expressive speech acts convey an emotion (often accompanied by an evaluation). In (27)–(31) *must* has the function of *intensifying* this emotive meaning⁴. Thus, in (27), *must* intensifies the degree of contrition or regret, which is an inherent meaning component of the apology scenario. Also, there appears to be an intensification of the evaluation that it is bad that the speaker is not *here in person*. In (28), the feeling of gratitude the speaker expresses seems to be much stronger than it would have been in an explicit performative utterance *I thank you for the dance [...]*. Analogously, the degree of joy and positive evaluation conveyed by the speaker in (29) and (30) regarding the *choice of marriage partner* and *successful trip through Europe* is stronger than in the corresponding plain performatives. Finally, (31) constitutes a stronger compliment than the unspecified explicit performative *I compliment [...]*. It should also be noted that in examples (27)–(31) *must* has the function of intensifying the evaluation of the respective propositional contents as GOOD, much as *can* does in the commissive sentences in (16)–(18).

2.3 Blocking the force of the performative verb

So far modally specified performatives have been considered that preserve the illocutionary force expressed by the performative verb. In this section, I briefly consider some cases in which the modal has the effect of *canceling* the illocutionary force of the performative verb. The result of this operation is an assertive speech act.

Consider the following pieces of fictional discourse:

- (32) “I’m the captain of this craft,” Pancho said firmly. “*I can order* you to stay inside.” (COCA 2001)
- (33) He gave her a crooked grin. “And I’m the owner. *I can fire* you.” “Not till we get back to Selene.” (COCA 2001)

In (32), the character named *Pancho* does not order his interlocutor to stay inside. The utterance *I can order you to stay inside* merely conveys that Pancho feels authorized to do so. The utterance states the possibility of a future order. Analogously, in (33), which is taken from the same narrative, Pancho gives to understand that he is entitled to fire the female interlocutor, but in saying *I can*

⁴ I would like to thank Linda Thornburg for her suggestion that in expressive performatives specified by *must* this modal has an intensifying function.

fire you he does not actually fire her. The utterance is literally a statement and indirectly functions as a threat to fire the addressee.

Why would *order* in the construction *I can order you to VP* lose its performative force? One explanation is that *can* implicates that the illocutionary act denoted by the performative verb, and, by inheritance, its propositional content, is to be evaluated positively (GOOD) and conveys a positive emotional stance such as JOY or CONTENTMENT (see Panther 1981). Recall e.g. the contrast between *I can inform you that p* (positive evaluation/emotion) and *I must inform you that p* (negative evaluation/emotion). Given their impositive and face-threatening character, orders are generally not evaluated by addressees as positive acts that induce positive feelings.

In contrast to orders, which evoke negative connotations, promises are judged to be “positive” speech acts; the purpose of a promise is to do something good, i.e. something that benefits the hearer. *Promise* therefore collocates very well with *can* (see (16)), preserving and enhancing or intensifying the illocutionary force of the performative verb. However, although the collocation *I must promise* is possible, the modal cancels the illocutionary force of the performative, as can be seen from example (34):

- (34) A kid from La Jolla told me about surfing and the sun-bleached rituals of the California beaches and the small coast towns I *must promise* to visit one day. (COCA 1997)

The result of combining *must* with *promise* in (34) is that the utterance is understood as the assertion of an obligation to perform the commissive speech act in the future. The loss of performativity is apparently caused by the pragmatic incompatibility between “positive” *promise* and “negative” *must*.

The reader will have noticed that assertives, commissives, directives, and expressives can be produced by means of hedged performatives, with certain constraints, some of which have been addressed in this chapter. But what about declarations? Declarations are like assertives in representing reality, but, in addition, if they are performed by authorized speakers, they *create* reality. Verbs of declaration cannot be hedged by modals without losing their performative character. Thus, (35a) is an act of pronouncing a couple man and wife, but (35b,c) are not declarations:

- (35) a. As your pastor, I *pronounce* you man and wife. (COCA 1991)
 b. As your pastor, I *can pronounce* you man and wife.
 c. As your pastor, I *must pronounce* you man and wife.

Similarly, (36a) constitutes, if uttered by an authorized person, an act of appointing, i.e., the addressee *is*, as a result of the speech act, the official East-West Dialogue Contact Person. In contrast, in (36b, 36c) *can* and *must*, respectively, cancel the illocutionary force of appointing. Utterance (36b) functions as an offer to become the contact person in question, and (36c) is a statement of some obligation that is to be fulfilled in the future.

- (36) a. I *appoint* you our official East-West Dialogue Contact Person. (COCA 2000)
 b. I *can appoint* you our official East-West Dialogue Contact Person.
 c. I *must appoint* you our official East-West Dialogue Contact Person.

One of the reasons for this idiosyncratic behavior of declarations may be that they require extra-linguistic institutions and, unlike other illocutionary types, they do not convey any kind of mental attitude, including beliefs, intentions, evaluations, or emotional attitudes (see Searle 1976: 15).

3 Conclusion

In this contribution I have made a case for associative relations among ACTUALITY, MODALITY, EVALUATION, and EMOTION. My main thesis is that these relations manifest themselves as metonymies in English, and presumably also in many other languages. These associative relations are not conceptually necessary, but what Panther and Thornburg (2007) call “contingent”. The most important metonymies postulated in this chapter are summarized in (37)–(40).

- (37) VIRTUALITY → ACTUALITY

The metonymy in (37) is a high-level inferential schema, two subtypes of which have been discussed in more detail in this chapter:

- (38) a. ABILITY TO ACT → ACTUAL ACTION⁵
 b. OBLIGATION TO ACT → ACTUAL ACTION

⁵ It is important to note that the reverse relationship, i.e. with ACTUAL ACTION as the source and A as the target, does not hold in the conception of metonymy proposed by e.g. Panther and Thornburg (2007). This latter relationship is not contingent, but one of semantic entailment.

I have also assumed that propositional contents *p* tend to be evaluated and that language users also have some emotional attitude towards *p*. The propositional content *p* may denote all kinds of states-of-affairs including events, actions, and more abstract situations. These metonymic relationships are given in (39):

- (39) a. $p \rightarrow \text{EVALUATION-OF } p$
 b. $p \rightarrow \text{EMOTION-CAUSED-BY } p$

Furthermore, I have argued that ABILITY in general triggers a concept of POSITIVE EVALUATION, such as GOOD, and a POSITIVE EMOTION, such as JOY, whereas OBLIGATION often (though not necessarily) evokes a NEGATIVE EVALUATION and a corresponding NEGATIVE EMOTION regarding a speech act and its propositional content.

From the preceding remarks, it follows that the concepts EVALUATION and EMOTION themselves are also metonymically linked. EVALUATION evokes EMOTION, but the reverse also holds: EMOTION can be the source for the target EVALUATION. This relation can be represented by means of two arrows pointing in opposite directions:

- (40) EVALUATION \rightleftharpoons EMOTION

On a final note, I suggest that (39) and (40) are instances of the ubiquitous metonymic schema CAUSE \rightarrow EFFECT. A propositional content may cause an evaluation of this content and emotional attitude towards it. And, last not least, there are strong ties of reciprocal causality between evaluations and emotions that are available for linguistic exploitation.

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